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ABSTRACT

Small natural features (SNFs), landscape elements that inﬂuence species persistence and
ecological functioning on a much larger scale than one would expect from their size, can
also offer a greater rate of return on conservation investment compared to that of larger
natural features or more broad-based conservation. However, their size and perceived lack
of signiﬁcance also makes them more vulnerable to threats and destruction. We examine
the management of SNFs and conservation of the associated ecosystem services they
generate from an economics perspective. Using the economic concept of market failure, we
identify three key themes that explain prevailing threats to SNFs and characterize
impediments to and opportunities for SNF management: (1) the degree to which beneﬁts
derived from the feature spillover, beyond the feature itself (spatially and temporally); (2)
the availability and quality of information about the feature and those who most directly
inﬂuence its management; and (3) the existence and enforcement of property rights and
legal standing of the feature. We argue that the efﬁcacy of alternative SNF management
approaches is highly case dependent and relies on four key components: (1) the speciﬁc
ecosystem services of interest; (2) the amount of redundancy of the SNF on the landscape
and the level of connectivity required by the SNF in order to provide ecosystem services; (3)
the particular market failures that need correcting and their scope and extent; and (4) the
magnitude and distribution of management costs.

KEYWORDS:
Biodiversity, Conservation, Ecosystem services, Land use, Small natural feature, Policy
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INTRODUCTION
A small natural feature (SNF) is a site with ecological importance that is disproportionate
to its size; sometimes because it provides resources that limit key populations or processes
that inﬂuence a much larger area; sometimes because it supports unusual diversity,
abundance, or productivity (Hunter, this issue). Examples of SNFs include desert springs
supporting endemic ﬁsh and other native species (Davis et al., this issue), large old trees
supporting cavity-dependent mammals (Lindenmayer, this issue), caves supporting large
colonies of bats (Medellin et al., this issue), and coral bommies supporting myriad marine
life (Lundquist et al., this issue).
As argued throughout this special issue (see Hunter et al., this issue), SNFs have both
ecological and socio-economic importance. Because SNFs are relatively small and often
represent distinct ecosystems, they are surprisingly diverse and contribute to overall
biodiversity (Lambertucci and Ruggiero, 2016; Davis et al., this issue; Fitzsimons and
Michael, this issue). SNF-supported species often provide services to human enterprises
such as agriculture, for example, by pollinating crops and controlling agricultural pests
(Medellin et al., this issue; Poschlod and Braun-Richert, this issue). SNF-supported processes
also generate human-valued services. For example, a modest riparian zone in a larger river
valley can reduce the pollutant load entering the river and help moderate ﬂooding peaks
through the valley (Watson et al., 2016; González et al., this issue) and some temporary
water bodies provide groundwater recharge (Acuña et al., this issue; Calhoun et al., this
issue). SNFs also provide recreational values (e.g., spelunking and snorkeling [Huth and
Morgan, 2011; Trujillo et al., 2016]), resource extraction (e.g., drinking water [Amondo,
2013]), and tourism and cultural amenities (e.g., aboriginal sites and cave art ([Rossi and
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Webb, 2007; Daniel et al., 2012]). While we can generally describe SNFs and the ecosystems
services they support (see Table 1 and the SNF case studies in this issue), socio-economic
aspects of SNF management and consequent impacts on the interactions among ecological
and human systems remain poorly understood.
Because small natural features support ecosystem services of value disproportionate to
their size, a focus on SNF management presents opportunities for cost-effective
conservation, especially compared to larger natural features or more broad-based
conservation efforts. However, the management of SNFs and the conservation of associated
ecosystem services are proving to be complex. First, their small stature means their
over-sized contribution to the landscape's provision of ecosystem services is often
unrecognized. Second, most conservation practices and polices used today are designed for
landscape-sized conservation and are mal-adapted for SNF-scale conservation. Third, as
made clear by the feature-speciﬁc articles of this issue (e.g., Davis et al., this issue;
Fitzsimons and Michael, this issue; Medellin et al., this issue), formal targeted protections of
these landscape elements have thus far been limited, making the promise of cost-effective
conservation from well-managed SNFs a non-trivial task. This synthesis is intended to
complement the articles of this special issue and call attention to management issues and
research needs.
In this paper, we examine the management of SNFs from an economics perspective. In
particular, we use the economic concept of market failure to explain the human behavior
behind prevailing threats to SNFs and to characterize impediments to and opportunities for
SNF management. Market failure is the key concept used by economists and other policy
scientists to inform environmental policy and natural resource management (Hackett, 2010;
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Sterner and Coria, 2013). Brieﬂy, most goods and services such as apples, cell phones, and
haircuts are exchanged through well-functioning markets. In contrast, goods and services
provided by nature are not typically exchanged in markets because one or more conditions
prevent their formation or undermine their functioning. Here, we explain the concept of
market failure in more detail to lay the foundation for discussion of SNF challenges and
management opportunities.
We also assess the efﬁcacy of alternative SNF management approaches. We argue that
efﬁcacy is a function of: (1) the types of ecosystem services generated; (2) the amount of
redundancy of the SNF on the landscape and the level of connectivity required by the SNF in
order to provide ecosystem services; (3) the market failures that need correcting and their
scope and extent; and (4) the magnitude and distribution of management costs. We
consider the potential mismatch between traditionally used conservation approaches (e.g.,
large-scale reserves) and SNFs, and explore the usefulness of under-utilized approaches
(e.g., tradable development rights, impact fees, and payments for ecosystem services).
While we draw on an economic perspective, our arguments acknowledge and appreciate
other social science perspectives (Ostrom et al., 2002; Dietz et al., 2003; Saunders et al.,
2006; Schlüter et al., 2017) and their important contributions to environmental
conservation (Berkes, 2007; Daniel et al., 2012; Hilbig et al., 2013). Although full
consideration of these contributions is beyond the scope of this paper, we incorporate
insights from these other ﬁelds into our synthesis. Further, by evaluating the need for and
efﬁcacy of distinct conservation approaches for SNFs, we strive to initiate new policy
discussions and lines of scientiﬁc research, as well as foster collaboration among natural and
social scientists (Saunders et al., 2006; Heberlein, 2012; Calhoun et al., 2014).
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MARKET FAILURES AND ISSUES IN SNF MANAGEMENT

The economic concept of market failure provides a useful means to examine the need for
SNF management and to assess the performance of alternative conservation approaches.
Economists identify several characteristics of well-functioning markets (Hackett, 2010;
Sterner and Coria, 2013). Market failures occur when one or more of these characteristics
are missing. Of particular importance to SNFs are situations in which third parties are
impacted in a positive or negative manner despite being outside the producer-consumer
transaction. For example, landowners who maintain or restore riparian zones or temporary
water bodies to ensure the quality of their well water may incidentally contribute to the
quality of neighboring well water (Trenholm et al., 2013; Acuña et al., this issue; Calhoun et
al., this issue). However, because there is no formal mechanism through which the
landowner can charge his neighbors a fee for improved water quality, he only engages in the
level of restoration and ongoing maintenance that meets his private needs. It could be that
neighbors would be willing to pay an amount for additional riparian zone restoration that
would more than cover the landowner's additional restoration costs, making everyone
better off. The foregone value that would accrue to neighbors from additional restoration
measures is the extent of the market failure.
Applied to SNFs, three relevant themes emerge when comparing and contrasting market
failures across different features: (1) the degree to which beneﬁts derived from the feature
spillover to third parties not involved in its management; (2) the availability of information
about both the feature itself and the values held by the feature's landowner; and (3) the
existence and enforcement of property rights and legal standing of the feature. Each is
discussed below in more detail. Throughout these discussions, we use a simpliﬁed example
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of a SNF in a terrestrial setting with a single landowner that holds all property rights for ease
of exposition, although we acknowledge that more complex ownership and property rights
regimes exist.

Spatial spillovers of SNF-generated ecosystem services

The spatial mismatch between SNF management costs and beneﬁts complicates their
management. Many SNFs are relatively small and located on a single parcel of land with
management costs incurred by an individual landowner. In contrast, most SNF-generated
beneﬁts reach well beyond parcel boundaries to other beneﬁciaries, an economic concept
known as positive spatial externalities or spatial spillovers. In many instances, the
landowner is unable to exclude others from receiving the ecosystem services provided and,
thus, cannot demand payment for these beneﬁts. While some beneﬁciaries might make
voluntary contributions, others will free ride off the generosity of their neighbors and the
landowner will not receive full compensation for services provided. Attempts by the
landowner to capture full payment will likely be too cumbersome to implement, or may be
impossible due to her inability to exclude others from receiving beneﬁts.
To illustrate, consider a single large, old tree growing in a meadow. The tree is private in
the sense that the owner of the meadow can do what she wants with the tree, including
having it removed. However, her neighbors also beneﬁt from the varied ecosystem services
provided by the tree. Up to this point, the meadow owner has not removed the tree
because the private value she has received from viewing the tree and the species that nest
in its cavities has been greater than the additional cost created by cumbersomely mowing
around the tree and raking its leaves. Recently, however, the meadow owner has become
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increasingly annoyed with cumbersome mowing and raking, and is considering having it
removed; her private beneﬁt of the tree has fallen below her private cost of maintaining it.
Yet, from society's point of view, the tree's beneﬁt stream is much greater than the meadow
owner's private cost and social cost-beneﬁt analysis argues for the tree's continued
presence. Those that value the scenic view created by the single large, old tree soaring over
the meadow can repeatedly indulge in the beneﬁt it creates at no cost. Unfortunately,
unless society provides an institution that allows the meadow owner to convert the tree's
aggregate social value into adequate compensation, she is likely to ignore the societal
cost-beneﬁt analysis. Even if passersby wanted to pay for the tree's beauty, there would be
no formal mechanism to do so. Further, any attempts by the meadow owner to exact a toll
from passersby (e.g., by hiring someone to collect a fee) would likely cost her more than the
money raised.
Similar examples occur for other SNFs (Table 2). For example, positive spatial spillovers
occur when prairie potholes provide duck habitat that beneﬁts hunters and when caves
provide bat habitat that beneﬁts farmers hundreds of miles away. SNF support of
biodiversity and other non-use values (e.g., cultural values for sites not visited), where
beneﬁciaries are numerous and widespread, is the extreme example of a positive spatial
spillover.

Imperfect information

Information ﬂows between buyers and sellers of goods and services are central to
well-functioning markets. Management of SNFs and conservation of the services they
provide is made difﬁcult by a lack of information on the ecological processes that SNFs
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support and, in some instances, an asymmetry in information among key human actors
(e.g., private landowners and government regulators). First, a lack of detailed information
about SNF beneﬁts, combined with their small stature, has led to perceptions of
insigniﬁcance by landowners, regulators, policy makers, and the public (Acuña et al., this
issue; Davis et al., this issue; Fitzsimons and Michael, this issue). Even scientists not directly
involved in the study of a speciﬁc type of SNF may be misinformed of its associated
ecosystem services. For example, vernal pools are not just small versions of permanent
wetlands; they provide habitat for a different set of species and perform different ecological
functions (Calhoun et al., this issue). Rocky outcrops are not lifeless geological formations,
but supporters of biodiversity by regulating microclimate and providing cavities to escape
predation (Michael et al., 2010; Fitzsimons and Michael, this issue). Widespread perceptions
of insigniﬁcance can perpetuate the information problem over the long term as limited
research, management, and outreach funds will go to natural features perceived to be more
important.
Further, the locations of many SNFs are unknown to landowners and regulators given
their small stature or temporary nature (e.g., temporary wetlands or streams) or that they
are underwater or underground (e.g., caves or reefs). While recent advances in remote
sensing techniques (Pettorelli et al., 2014; Jetz et al., 2016) and applications of citizen
science and mobile technologies (Jansujwicz et al., 2013)offer great potential for locating
SNFs, some of these technologies or approaches may be expensive to employ consistently
over large areas.
Additionally, even if landowners are aware of SNFs on their property, they may not reveal
this information to government ofﬁcials. If the presence of a SNF could lead to restrictions
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of their future land use or management options, we can expect some landowners to hide it
from regulators (Brook et al., 2003), or worse yet, destroy it before the regulator can
become aware of its existence. This information asymmetry issue is similar to that in
endangered species protection (Arguedas and van Soest, 2011) and is known as the “shoot,
shovel, and shut up” phenomenon (Polasky and Doremus, 1998; Lewis and Nelson, 2014). As
long as the cost of destruction and the probability of the regulator detecting the destruction
are both low, which is likely to be true of many SNFs, destroying the SNF could be enticing.
Information asymmetries between resource users and regulators of ecosystem services can
also be an issue even if the SNF is on public land. Suppose a government gives a logging
company a timber concession in a publicly owned forest. If the logging company comes
across an old, large tree that the regulator does not know about, the company is likely to
have little to no motivation to tell the regulator of its existence unless given an incentive to
do so.
Even if signiﬁcance is acknowledged and locations are known, there may still be a lack of
information on the quality of the ecosystem services provided by individual SNFs.
Classiﬁcation systems are often used by research scientists and government regulators to
differentiate among SNF quality (Harris, 1992; van Beynen, 2011). For example, the Maine
(U.S.) vernal pool regulation distinguishes a subset of vernal pools as signiﬁcant based on
speciﬁc scientiﬁc criteria. Unfortunately, individual landowners may not fully understand
these criteria and must either protect the pool not knowing its status (so, perhaps unnecessarily) or incur the cost of hiring a consultant to determine its status.
Finally, if the goal of SNF management is to maximize social welfare, or if the
management mechanism involves payments to SNF landowners equal to their cost of SNF
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management, then the implementing government agency or non-proﬁt organization will
need to acquire information on landowner stewardship values and management costs, as
well as accurately measure the services the SNFs provide, in order to offer an efﬁcient
payment. In most cases, ﬁnding all of this information is difﬁcult, if not impossible.

Ill-deﬁned or unenforced property rights, legal standing, and social status

A lack of clearly deﬁned property rights over SNFs, whether the rights are individual,
communal, or state, can undermine their management. Ill-deﬁned or unenforced property
rights can result in the overexploitation of SNFs because multiple people will exploit the resource and each person's incentive is to exploit what they can before others do. For
example, if it is unclear who has the right to determine the fate of a coral bommie, an angler
may race to harvest the valuable ﬁsh resources the bommie supports before his rival anglers
do. Similarly, scuba divers and snorkelers may arrive in overabundance or during key
breeding seasons, disturbing wildlife populations or damaging the reef itself. A lack of
property rights means the individual angler or diver does not have to be worried about
being punished for any action he takes. Alternatively, if the reef were owned or formally
managed by an individual, small group, or the local village, decisions over the SNF could be
more deliberate.
In some cases, property rights may be well established, but they might conﬂict with one
another. For example, private rights to land use (e.g., farming or mining) often conﬂict with
the emerging consensus in many cultures that the public has a right to a certain level of
environmental quality, and the choice between a “polluter pays” or a “beneﬁciary pays”
conservation approach will vary among societies, land use type, and ecosystem services
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provided (Wegner, 2016). In other cases, property rights might belong jointly to a large
group or even an entire nation (e.g., consider the 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the
marine realm), with potential for large and often prohibitive costs for coordination of
management efforts and enforcement. For example, Witjira National Park in Australia was
formed to protect over 60 mound springs, however the large number of visitors to the park
and limited ranger presence resulted in many springs becoming degraded (Harris, 1992).
Many SNFs support ecosystem services with direct use values (Table 1) such as recreation
(e.g., spelunking in caves), tourism (e.g., visiting hot springs), and resource extraction (e.g.,
collecting guano from caves, harvesting large, old trees) can attract an overabundance of
users. Often, direct use value is created by physical contact with SNFs that can pose threats
to the other ecosystem services they provide. For example, caves and rocky outcrops are
particularly vulnerable to overuse, in part because their hard surfaces create a perception of
permanence and users are unaware of the subtle impacts their presence makes on the
physical structure and nearby wildlife (Moncrieff, 2000; Rossi and Webb, 2007). Some SNFs
in this category have features that attract a speciﬁc use (e.g., cave art viewing, hot springs
bathing) which then lead to more general uses (e.g., hiking, wildlife viewing) and potential
abuses in the surrounding area. This is more likely to occur on public lands, but it can also
occur on private lands.
Related to property rights is the issue of legal standing. The extent to which SNFs qualify
for legal protection—for example, are small, temporary water bodies entitled the same level
of protection as larger, permanent water bodies?—and the extent to which they are
regarded as signiﬁcant by scientists, government ofﬁcials, and the public, inﬂuences the
formation and functioning of human institutions. Arguably, the small size of SNFs may
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account for a lack of legal and social standing for many of the features examined in this
special issue. Consider that the US Endangered Species Act provides protection for old
growth forests, habitat for an endangered spotted owl, but not for individual old, large
trees, and the US Clean Water Act protects rivers and lakes, but not all temporary wetlands
or streams. In comparison, temporary streams in Australia are considered watercourses
similar to larger, permanent streams, while the European Union is inconsistent in its
treatment of temporary streams depending on the region (Acuña et al., 2014).
Further, interactions among legal and social standing introduce interesting dynamics
within this management context. For example, if perceptions of SNF insigniﬁcance exist
among private landowners, they may ignore regulatory limits on SNF use or destruction.
Conversely, if perceptions of SNF signiﬁcance exist among landowners, they may act as
stewards even without formal regulations. For example, farmers in Costa Rica maintain
remnant trees for personal enjoyment in addition to other more practical reasons like
ﬁrewood and wind protection (Harvey and Haber, 1998) and two thirds of riparian
landowners surveyed in Oregon (US) consider land stewardship a moral obligation
(Rosenberg and Margerum, 2008). Similar dynamics may inﬂuence SNF support and
research by scientists.

APPROACHES FOR MANAGING SNFS

To address market failures, societies can establish policies, programs, or institutions that
align the interests of private landowners with social interests, provide or reveal missing
information, or establish and enforce property rights. In some cases, this will involve
governments regulating landowner behavior, forcing landowners to bear the management
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costs. In other cases, government agencies or non-proﬁts offer ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial
incentives to providers of valuable ecosystem services to facilitate provisioning of the
socially efﬁcient amount. In still other instances, deﬁning and enforcing property rights or
changing the legal standing of a resource can lead to better conservation outcomes.
Generalizing management strategies by SNF type is not useful because SNF situations can
vary dramatically. Rather, the choice of management approach may be primarily driven by
the particular ecosystem service(s) of interest and the type and extent of market failures.

Managing SNF with positive spatial spillovers where the “polluters” pay

In situations where regulators or the public at large have decided public rights to
environmental quality and ecosystem service provision overrule the private property rights
of individual landowners, a variety of SNF management approaches have potential. In these
“polluter pays” approaches, the cost burden of managing the SNF to provide the socially
desired level of ecosystem services falls on the landowner. As we consider alternative
approaches to manage spatial spillovers, we assume that property rights are well deﬁned
(i.e., ill-deﬁned property rights are not the reason for market failure and are discussed in a
later section), while non-excludable beneﬁts that spill over parcel boundaries are the
reasons for market failure. We begin our discussion with regulatory approaches and
continue through to more market-based approaches.
Land use regulations limit the type and intensity of activities allowed on a parcel and
typically establish a baseline of land-use intensity across a relatively large region.
Historically, these baselines have been set too high for the sustainable provisioning and
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socially desired level of SNF ecosystem services (Acuña et al., this issue; Calhoun et al., this
issue; Davis et al., this issue). There are a number of advantages to untargeted land-use
regulations. All landowners are treated the same, so there is no need to negotiate speciﬁc
contracts. Changes to existing regulations can occur without consulting all affected
landowners. Further, the regulator does not need to know the exact value of the ecosystem
services provided or landowner opportunity costs to devise policy, and no coordination of
activities among landowners is required (i.e., there are minimal administrative costs).
Finally, land-use regulations may also be perceived as equitable as all landowners share the
burden of conservation. However, because SNFs and their ecosystem service beneﬁts are
not evenly distributed across the landscape, a typical landscape-wide land-use regulation
might not target a SNF's conservation problem very well. For commonly occurring SNFs,
such as prairie potholes in North America and mound springs in southern Australia,
extremely large opportunity costs could make the policy politically infeasible. Treating all
SNFs the same may be perceived as equitable, but could be highly inefﬁcient (i.e., not
cost-effective) if the provisioning of ecosystem services is variable among individual
occurrences. In summary, untargeted land-use regulations, while administratively
straightforward, could create large costs for little SNF-generated beneﬁt. Although there are
several ways to target land-use regulations while reducing overall opportunity costs (e.g.,
Bauer et al., 2010; Freeman and Bell, 2011), increases in regulatory ﬂexibility to address
ecological heterogeneity often create higher administrative costs. That is, a tradeoff exists
between the opportunity costs to landowners and the administrative costs to the regulator,
and it may be unclear which approach minimizes the total cost burden to society.
Transferable development rights (TDR) programs set an overall limit on the amount of
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development (e.g., number of housing units) that can take place and distribute these rights
(i.e., development permits) among current landowners (Chiodelli and Moroni, 2016). There
are several advantages to TDRs over untargeted land-use regulation. Landowners can use
the permit to develop their own parcel or sell the permit to another landowner, such that
landowners are at least partially compensated for not developing. Therefore, compared to
untargeted land-use regulations, they can minimize the amount that the “polluters pay”.
When TDRs are combined with additional land-use restrictions (e.g., designated open space
areas), high quality SNFs can be spatially targeted for lower intensity use, although the
information costs associated with identifying these SNFs could be large. There are also some
disadvantages to TDRs. By restricting overall development in a community, TDRs can
generate high opportunity costs. Alternatively, allowing the same amount of housing but on
less land can create housing patterns that are less attractive to home buyers (Kopits et al.,
2007). Transaction costs associated with bringing buyers and sellers together in a TDR
market, as well as ongoing monitoring and enforcement costs, could be high. Finally,
distributing development rights evenly among current landowners might be socially
inefﬁcient if some of the landowners receiving a permit were not going to develop anyway,
thereby being compensated for conservation that would have occurred without the TDR
program.
Impact fees are payments from landowners for permitted development or other intensive
land uses (e.g., a tax on fertilizer or pesticide use) that results in ecological damages. The
regulator could set a simple one-size ﬁts all fee, thereby lowering administration costs;
however, this could result in fees that severely under or overvalue beneﬁts and lead to
increased litigation. Instead, the regulator could attempt to set the fee or tax equal to the
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value of the ecosystem services lost via the development or land management activity. Such
a system would ensure that landowners pay for their exact damage, however, the cost of
determining which ecosystem services will be damaged by an activity and the controversy
and uncertainty of measuring the level of damage in monetary terms are likely to be quite
high (Ruckelshaus et al., 2015). This is particularly true in cases where SNF location is
unknown to regulators or where linkages to ecosystem service provisioning remain highly
unstudied. Thus, use of impact fees may be best when there are no additional information
costs.

Managing SNF with positive spatial spillovers where the “beneﬁciaries” pay

In situations where the private property rights of individual landowners are favored over
society's rights to ecosystem service provisioning, other management approaches may be
more appropriate. In these “beneﬁciary pays” approaches, the cost burden of managing the
SNF to provide the socially desired level of ecosystem services falls on those who receive
value from the ecosystem services and are often borne by government agencies or
non-proﬁts. Again, we assume for simplicity of discourse that property rights are well
deﬁned. We begin our discussion of such approaches by summarizing large-scale acquisition
approaches and continue through to more ﬂexible and individualized approaches.
The extreme and arguably most common approach to conservation for which
beneﬁciaries pay involves the outright purchase of land (i.e., fee simple acquisition) by a
government agency or non-proﬁt organization (e.g., a land trust), that often permanently
protects the land in a natural state. From an ecological perspective, this approach can be
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highly successful. However, this approach can also be extremely expensive and is likely
inefﬁcient for the management of SNFs, particularly small and widely distributed SNFs such
as temporary wetlands, rocky outcrops, and single large trees that may be able to co-exist
on working lands (Calhoun et al., this issue; Fitzsimons and Michael, this issue; Lindenmayer,
this issue).
Conservation easements separate use rights from the land itself (Rissman et al., 2007).
Payments are typically made to landowners for the purchase of development rights (PDRs),
but may also target water, mining, or grazing rights. In other words, the purchaser of
development or other use rights can target speciﬁc SNF-generated ecosystem services in
speciﬁc locations. The landowner retains ownership and may continue to use the land in
other less-harmful ways depending on which use rights remain intact. Conservation
easements are less costly than outright purchase, but may still be expensive depending on
the use rights that are given up. Easements do have their issues, however. Determining the
value of easements can be difﬁcult and large transactions costs may be associated with
negotiating individual contracts. In addition, because many agreements are termed in
perpetuity, ongoing monitoring and enforcement costs can be quite high (Fitzsimons and
Carr, 2014).
Targeted payments for ecosystem services (PES) and other subsidies can be made to
landowners as incentives to: (1) engage in some activity or group of activities that maintain,
restore, or improve the provision of one or more ecosystem services (e.g., creating
vegetative buffer strips, installing fencing, or delaying mowing); (2) reduce the intensity of
active land uses (e.g., grazing fewer cattle or building fewer homes); or (3) cease productive
land use altogether. Payments can be monetary or in-kind and can come from government
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agencies, non-proﬁts, or the direct beneﬁciaries (Engel et al., 2008; Engel, 2016). Recall the
meadow owner with her large, old tree; she was bearing the cost burden of providing a
good that society valued much more than she did. Rather than forcing her to bear this
burden via a policy that prohibits private landowners from removing old trees, beneﬁciaries
(e.g., the local community) could pay her for the service ﬂow her tree provides. However,
the administrative costs of PES schemes can be quite high, and it can be extremely difﬁcult
to select the best participants from a group of applicants (Sorice et al., 2011, 2012). For
example, landowners are more knowledgeable of opportunity costs than regulators and,
therefore, can extract payments that are much higher than their minimum willingness to
accept (Lennox and Armsworth, 2013; Polasky et al., 2014). In addition, the offering of
payments may change the framing of environmental behavior and weaken the landowner's
sense of a moral obligation (Thorgersen, 1996). In both cases, less conservation is
accomplished than is possible because recipients would have accepted smaller payments
leaving funds for extra conservation elsewhere. Additionally, if private landowners know
that the key to conserving landscape-wide ecosystem services hinges on SNF conservation
on their land, then they may be able to bargain for exorbitant conservation payments
(Polasky and Doremus, 1998; Arguedas and van Soest, 2011). Further, to maximize gains in
social welfare, PES schemes have to set payments equal to the value of beneﬁts procured,
but determining their values can be challenging (Pattanayak et al., 2010). For example, how
much value does the large tree in the middle of the meadow actually provide to society?
Finally, while individual landowners will generally account for personal stewardship
values in their private decision-making, it may be possible to motivate additional
stewardship through non-monetary rewards such as public acknowledgement of speciﬁc

19

stewardship efforts or through public admonishment of a lack of stewardship (Harvey and
Haber, 1998; Ryan et al., 2003; Rosenberg and Margerum, 2008; Pasquini et al., 2010).

Managing SNF in situations with imperfect or asymmetric information

A lack of information can be an impediment to SNF management. Subsidies that offer
education opportunities to landowners and regulators about the ecosystem services
provided by SNFs can help to change perceptions of insigniﬁcance that leads to better
management. Subsidies in the form of research funds can help to develop and promote new
remote sensing technologies (Pettorelli et al., 2014; Jetz et al., 2016). Public education can
foster citizen science programs to help locate SNFs (Jansujwicz et al., 2013). In the case of
asymmetric information, where the landowner knows the location of a SNF, the use of
auctions rather than direct payments for ecosystem services is one way to get landowners
to reveal their private values (Stoneham et al., 2003; Jack et al., 2009). In other situations,
motivating stewardship values may be enough to gain landowner participation in
conservation programs.

Managing SNF in situations with imperfect property rights

While situations of a complete lack of property rights are rare, situations where
ownership rights are established but use rights are ill-deﬁned, unenforced, or conﬂict with
each other occur frequently on public lands and in the marine environment. For common
resources like these, ill-deﬁned use rights can induce problems of over-exploitation. Man-
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agement for direct use values often focuses on limiting the type, timing, or amount of use at
the location of the SNF itself.
Permits and licenses are regulatory mechanisms that allow holders to use a particular SNF
in a proscribed way. In this manner, governments can use permits as a mechanism to
establish speciﬁc property rights. A government agency limits or regulates the number and
type of permits issued, which may have a temporal (e.g., seasonal, day/night) or tiered-use
(e.g., unrestricted access/restricted access requiring a permit/no access) conﬁguration.
Permits may be given away for free, sold for a fee, or may be auctioned to the highest
bidder, with generated revenues used to cover infrastructure, administrative, monitoring,
and enforcement costs.
User fees are market-based mechanisms that establish prices for public goods and
services. The idea is that by charging a fee, direct use can be reduced. Prices can be
implemented using different types of market segmentation (e.g., higher prices during peak
use times or higher prices for more intensive uses) with the idea that higher prices will
lower demand for SNF use. For many ecosystem goods and services, determining the
socially efﬁcient price can be a challenge. In those cases, survey research and other
non-market valuation techniques can be used, for example, to determine park and cave
entrance fees (Tapsuwan et al., 2010). Again, revenues can be used to cover a variety of
management costs.
As an alternative to formal property rights regimes, local communities or user groups
(e.g., hunting associations or spelunker societies) can establish informal institutions, such as
community-based conservation plans, and social norms that facilitate cooperative and
sustainable management that beneﬁts the entire community (Ostrom et al., 2002; Dietz et
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al., 2003; Berkes, 2007). These types of arrangements beneﬁt from local knowledge and
social peer structures.

SNF management synthesis

We expect the efﬁcacy of alternative SNF management approaches to be highly case
dependent and inﬂuenced by four key components: (1) the speciﬁc ecosystem services of
interest; (2) the amount of redundancy of the SNF on the landscape and the level of
connectivity required by the SNF in order to provide ecosystem services; (3) the particular
market failures that need correcting and their scope and extent; and (4) the magnitude and
distribution of management costs. Below, we consider each of these components in an
effort to provide insights for practitioners, regulators, and policy makers.
Most broad categories of SNFs provide a wide variety of ecosystem services (Table 1);
however, an individual SNF occurrence may be most valued for its provision of one kind of
service. One cave may contain prehistoric cave art and be a popular tourist attraction, while
another may be a hotspot for spelunkers, and still another may be a major roosting site for
hibernating bats. Identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc ecosystem service of interest is important
because it determines: the spatial extent of the landscape/seascape that managers or
regulators have to worry about (i.e., the conservation zone), the uses of that landscape that
are impairing the ability of the SNF to provide its services, and how many parties need to be
involved in the feature's conservation. Some ecosystem services provided by SNFs (like ﬂood
control) require coordinated activity across large landscapes and other ecosystem services
can be affected by landscape-wide disturbances like pollution (e.g., vernal pools).
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Conservation of these ecosystem services will require many people to be involved in a
conservation plan. In other cases, such as protecting roosting habitat for bats in caves,
conservation activities may be focused on a smaller geographic area and involve few parties.
When the conservation zone is large, conservation costs will generally be higher.
Coordinating intervention will also be more difﬁcult. If the number of landowners needed
for conservation success is low, then market or incentive-based approaches (e.g., land
purchases, easements, and payments for ecosystem services) are simpler. If many
landowners need to be involved, then simple and crude approaches (e.g., land-use
regulations, education) will often work better.
The level of redundancy of the SNF on the landscape and the level of connectivity
required by the SNF in order to provide ecosystem services inﬂuence the appropriate
conservation approach as well. For example, consider a series of caves in an area that all
provide roosting habitat for bats. If each cave is unremarkable except for their habitat
provision, then the destruction of some of the caves in the series may not appreciably affect
the habitat service provided by the cave system. However, if one of the caves contains
prehistoric cave art, while another is a hotspot for spelunkers, then each cave in the system
has to be conserved or the provision of one or more ecosystem services will be lost. The
ﬂexibility of conservation strategies decreases as feature redundancy and connectivity
requirements increase.
The types and extent of market failures associated with SNFs greatly inﬂuence the
efﬁcacy of alternative conservation approaches. A complete understanding of the ecological
processes and associated ecosystem services is lacking to some degree for all SNFs (Hunter
et al., this issue). This lack of information favors the use of crude and simple approaches
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such as untargeted land-use regulations or outright purchase, which are quite expensive,
and perhaps explains the limited formal protections in place to conserve SNFs. Looking
ahead, research and education that improve understanding of the linkages between SNFs
and the ecosystem services they provide will broaden the feasibility and efﬁcacy of more
complicated approaches and address information problems including the “perception of
insigniﬁcance” challenge. Managing to address ill-deﬁned or unenforced property rights
may be key for some SNFs, because without someone or some group with authority to make
decisions and establish legal protections, it will be impossible to take steps towards formal
management approaches. Given the likelihood of multiple types of market failures,
strategies that rely on multiple approaches (polluter pays and beneﬁciaries pay; market and
non-market based approaches; education; property rights) may prove most successful
(Kinzig et al., 2011).
The magnitude and distribution of management costs also affect the efﬁcacy of
management approaches. Relevant costs include opportunity costs (i.e., foregone use
beneﬁts), management (administrative, monitoring, enforcement) costs, transaction
(information, contracting, coordination) costs, and, in some cases, acquisition costs (Naidoo
et al., 2006). Large-scale reserves are not likely to be cost-effective for managing the
majority of SNFs due to the high costs associated with purchasing land outright. In
comparison, economic incentives that reduce land-use intensity rather than eliminating all
land uses, cost less and are beginning to show promise (e.g., see Perkins et al., 2011;
Robertson et al., 2014). These lower costs are much more likely to fall within organizations'
conservation budgets than larger landscape level projects.
Community attitudes towards conservation can inﬂuence the dominant property rights
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regime (i.e., “polluter pays” versus “beneﬁciary pays”) which ultimately determines who
incurs the management cost burden. Sharing the cost burden among landowners and the
rest of society may result in higher total costs, but may provide more equitable (and
perhaps more politically feasible) alternatives. However, there are many factors that
inﬂuence conservation behavior including how an individual identiﬁes socially (e.g., as a
rancher or as an environmentalist) and the existence of multiple identities can lead to social
conﬂict (Saunders et al., 2006). Social norms guide behavior, but changing social norms
requires motivation in addition to education (Schultz, 2011). Understanding and capitalizing
on patterns in human attitudes and behaviors towards SNFs, as well as the structure and
nature of human policies and institutions regarding SNFs, affords tremendous opportunities
for creating multiple pockets of cost-effective conservation across the larger landscape.

SUMMARY

In this paper, we examined the management of small natural features (SNFs) and
conservation of the associated ecosystem services they generate from an economics
perspective. Using the economic concept of market failure, we identiﬁed three key themes
that explain prevailing threats to SNFs and characterize impediments to and opportunities
for SNF management: (1) the degree to which beneﬁts derived from the feature spillover to
third parties not involved in its management, creating a mismatch between those who incur
the costs of management and those who beneﬁt; (2) the availability of information about
the location and quality of the features, and the values they provide to the feature's landowner and society at large; and (3) the lack of existence and enforcement of well-deﬁned
ownership and use rights, and legal standing of the feature. While these types of market
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failures are not uncommon in biodiversity and ecosystem service conservation, SNFs' small
stature, perceived insigniﬁcance, and unexpected large-scale spatial beneﬁts increase the
likelihood of SNF conservation failure.
After reviewing several conservation approaches, we noted that the efﬁcacy of
alternative SNF management approaches is highly case dependent and relies on four key
components: (1) the speciﬁc ecosystem services of interest; (2) the amount of redundancy
of the SNF on the landscape and the level of connectivity required by the SNF in order to
provide ecosystem services; (3) the particular market failures that need correcting, and their
scope and extent; and (4) the magnitude and distribution of management costs. The
combination of these components for a speciﬁc SNF determines the most effective
conservation mechanism(s).
These insights provide input to an initial roadmap for future conservation strategies
(Hunter et al., this issue) and represent a ﬁrst step in facilitating collaborations among
natural and social scientists. Information, laws, institutions, programs, and technology
designed to overcome these issues can seize opportunities for cost-effective SNF
conservation. Research and education that improve our understanding of the linkages
between SNFs and the ecosystem services they provide offers critical support of these
efforts. Similarly, new remote sensing and mobile technologies and applications of citizen
science offer tremendous potential. Finally, close collaborations among natural and social
scientists (Saunders et al., 2006; Heberlein, 2012) will continue to expand our understanding
of human and natural systems and the possibilities for SNF conservation.
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